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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DAN L. KARTCHNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14283 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by Salt Lake County seeking a 
mandatory injunction against appellant Dan L. Kartchner to 
require him to remove a portion of a carport in violation of 
the setback requirements of the zoning ordinances of Salt Lake 
County and to require him to obtain a building permit for the 
remaining portion of the carport. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was heard without a jury before the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, one of the judges of the Third District Court, 
on July 16, 1975. The court held for respondent Salt Lake County 
and granted a mandatory injunction against appellant requiring 
him to remove 6.5 feet of the carport which was found to be in 
violation of the setback requirements of the zoning ordinances 
of Salt Lake County. The court also ordered that appellant 
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obtain a building permit and pay a penalty fee for the remaining 
portion of the carport. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Salt Lake County seeks affirmance of the 
lower court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the spring of 1972, appellant began building a 
carport on his residence at 10257 South 1280 East in Salt Lake 
County. R-86. Appellant did not obtain a building permit for 
the structure, although he testified that he knew one was 
required under the law. R-86. Appellant's property is located 
in an R-l-8 zone which requires that carports be set back 30 
feet from the front property line or the average of the exist-
ing buildings where 50 per cent or more of the frontage is 
developed. R-73. Appellant was required to set back his 
carport 26 feet from the street, which was the average setback 
of the houses on appellant's street. R-74. Appellant's carport 
was set back only 20 feet. R-71. 
On May 22, 1972, Lamar Williams, a County building 
enforcement inspector, noticed the construction at appellant's 
residence and, as appellant was not home, left a notice at the 
residence stating that appellant would have to obtain a building 
permit for the structure. Exhibit P-l, R-60. At that time, the 
project was just beginning. R-62. Again, on November 7, 1972, 
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Mr. Williams returned to appellant's property and, as appellant 
was not at home again, left a second notice at his home, 
stating that appellant needed a building permit for the car-
port and that the carport would have to comply with the set-
back requirements of the zoning ordinance. The report noted 
that he was 10 feet in violation. Exhibit P-2, R-62. The 
project was well under way at that time. R-62* 
On February 20, 1973, Martin Dee Jeffs, a zoning 
inspector for Salt Lake County, personally visited appellant at 
his residence where he was putting the final touches on the 
carport. At that time, appellant admitted he had continued 
working on the project in spite of the prior notices. R-69. 
On February 22, 1973, Mr. Jeffs mailed a notice to appellant 
to stop work on the project and to remove the carport because 
it was in violation of the setback requirements of the zoning 
ordinance and that his variance had been denied by the Board of 
Adjustment. Exhibit P-3. 
On March 7, 1973, Salt Lake County filed the captioned 




LACHES IS NOT A PROPER DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant, in his brief, cites several cases for the 
general proposition that laches may be an appropriate defense 
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in a private action where there has been an unconscionable 
delay in seeking relief. None of these cases involve an action 
by a municipality to enjoin violation of its laws because the 
rule does not apply in such cases. This exception to the 
doctrine of laches is stated in 3 Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning, Section 23.15, p. 651: 
"Delay which might forfeit a private 
person's right to have a zoning viola-
tion enjoined does not affect a similar 
right in a municipality. Thus, a muni-
cipality may maintain an action to enjoin 
violation of the zoning ordinance although 
the violation has existed for more than 20 
years without any objection being expressed 
by municipal officials." 
The courts have consistently held that the doctrine of 
laches has no application to the enforcement of zoning ordinances 
by a municipality. Fabini v. Kemmerer Realty Co., 175 N.Y.2d 
964 (N.Y. 1958); Everett v. Capitol Motor Transportation Co., 
114 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1953); Lincoln v. Giles, 57 N.E.2d 554 
(Mass. 1944); Pallman v. East Haven, 67 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1949); 
Bianco v. Town of Darien, 254 A.2d 898 (Conn. 1969), citing 
numerous other cases. 
In Lincoln v. Giles, supra, the court rejected the 
contention that a delay of a building inspector in proceeding 
against the defendant therein after he began the illegal use of 
his property barred the municipality from proceeding against 
the defendant. The court stated: 
"The delay of the building inspector, if 
there was a delay, in proceeding against 
the defendant after he began to use his 
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premises for a purpose not permitted by 
the by-law does not bar the town from 
enforcing the by-law. The plaintiff town 
brings this bill not to enforce some 
private or proprietary right but as a 
governmental agency to protect the public 
interest; and if, as the defendant urges, 
but which we do not decide, there was delay 
by a public official in bringing proceedings 
against him, that delay cannot be imputed to 
the plaintiff." 57 N.E.2d at 555. 
In any event, the lower court found that the evidence 
did not establish the defense of laches, which finding is 
supported by the record. Each time the County contacted the 
appellant, he was notified that he was in violation of the law. 
Never did any County official acquiesce in the illegal building 
of the carports Appellant's apparent position that the County 
has to immediately catch and stop him from violating the zoning 
ordinance in order to have a right to enforce its laws is unten-
able. The action was instigated within a year from the date 
appellant began the project after County employees gave appellant 
numerous opportunities to correct the problem. 
POINT II 
THE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCE 
BECAUSE THERE MAY BE INSTANCES WHERE THE ZONING ORDINANCE HAS 
NOT BEEN ENFORCED. 
Appellant, in his brief, contends that the County 
may not enforce its zoning ordinance against appellant because 
there may be other instances of violations in the neighborhood 
which have not been enforced by the County. This position was 
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rejected by this court in State v. Starlite Cluby 17 U.2d 174, 
406 P.2d 912 (1969), where the court, through Justice Henroid, 
stated in rejecting the defense, that the State of Utah was 
estopped from bringing an action against the defendant therein 
for liquor violations because of other alleged violations 
which had not been prosecuted: 
"We think such a conclusion is a non-
sequetor that could lead to rather 
startling results requiring, for 
example, that a convicted burglar 
could demand release since many 
other burglars have not been prosecuted 
and convicted or had been treated not 
exactly the same." 
In the area of zoning, the courts have also con-
sistently held that a failure to comply with a zoning ordinance 
cannot be justified because of the existence of violations of 
other persons. Kansas City v. Wilhoit, 237 S.W.2d 919 
(Mo. App. 1951); Lee v. Wichita, 83 P.2d 644 (Kan. 1938); 
State v. Caine, 242 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1952); and State v. Martin, 
171 S.E.2d 115 (N.C. 1969). 
Similar to the problem of police officers attempt-
ing to enforce traffic violations, zoning enforcement inspec-
tors do not have the manpower to bring an action against every 
possible zoning violator. In fact, it is difficult to enforce 
even current violations. Long existing violations are difficult 
to establish because of stale facts and non-conforming uses. 
In addition, the person responsible for the violation may not 
-6-
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be the current owner. This was not the case here where the 
property owner was repeatedly warned by County officials that 
he was violating a law and proceeded to build the carport in 
violation of the law anyway* 
POINT III 
INJUNCTION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN THIS CASE TO 
CORRECT THE UNLAWFUL SITUATION. 
As appellant acknowledges in his brief, Utah Code 
Annotated 17-27-23 specifically grants to the County Attorney 
the right to instigate injunction actions to remove an unlawful 
construction. None of the cases cited by appellant discussing 
injunction are relevant as they involve private actions and not 
a statutory right granted to a municipality. For the County to 
bring a criminal action against appellant where he would likely 
be fined would not correct the illegal situation. The only 
appropriate remedy by the County which will rectify the unlawful 
situation intentionally created by appellant is an injunction. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANT IS IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 22-16-7 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
Section 22-16-7 provides as follows: 
"The minimum depth of a front yard . . . 
for private garages which shall have a 
minimum side yard of eight feet shall 
be 30 feet or the average of the existing 
buildings where 50 per cent or more of 
the frontage is developed . . . ." 
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Mr. Jeffs testified that appellant1s carport is 20 
feet from his front property line and the average frontage 
for the houses on the street is 26 feet. Corner lots were 
excluded from the measurement because they may front on either 
street they abut as long as they have a 30-foot setback on the 
side of the house considered as the front yard and a 20-foot 
setback on the side considered as the side yard. R-87. 
Mr. Jeffs testified that the setbacks for the corner lots com-
plied with the ordinance requirement which means that the 
corner lots have a 30-foot setback on the street appellant's 
house fronts on, or that they have a 30-foot setback on the 
adjoining street, in which case they are not considered as 
fronting on appellant's street. Thus, measuring the corner 
lots, if they did front on the same street as appellant's house, 
could only have made the 26 foot figure greater. In any event, 
no objection was made to Mr. Jeffs' testimony at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Setback requirements play an important function in 
a zoning plan and their validity has been approved by numerous 
courts, including this Court. Hargraves v. Young, 3 U.2d 175, 
280 P.2d 974 (1955). Appellant's position that he should not 
have to comply with County setback requirements because it 
would be a hardship for him to do so fails to take into account 
the fact that the hardship is a self-created one caused by 
-8-
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his intentional disregard of the law. In essence, appellant 
is attempting to turn his disregard of the law to his advantage. 
If this Court were to sustain such a position, it would encourage 
others to build in violation of the law and then claim the 
structure should not be removed because it would create a 
hardship to do so. For this reason and the reasons heretofore 
enumerated, respondent Salt Lake County prays that the decision 
of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Salt Lake County 
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